Abstract. Unconditionally secure authentication codes with arbitration (A 2 -codes) protect against deceptions from the transmitter and the receiver as well as that from the opponent. In this paper, we present combinatorial lower bounds on the cheating probabilities for A 2 -codes in terms of the number of source states, that of the whole messages and that of messages which the receiver accepts as authentic for each source state. Previously, only entropy based lower bounds were known. Our bounds for the model without secrecy are tight because the A 2 -codes given by Johansson meet our bounds with equality.
Introduction
In the model of unconditionally secure authentication codes (A-codes) [1] , there are three participants, a transmitter, a receiver and an opponent. The opponent tries to cheat the receiver by impersonation attack and substitution attack. This model has been studied extensively so far. Lower bounds on the cheating probabilities based on entropy were given by [2, 3] . Combinatorial lower bounds were given by [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . In this model, the transmitter and the receiver are both honest and trust each other. However, it is not always the case that the two parties want to trust each other.
Inspired by this problem, Simmons introduced an extended model, A 2 -code model, in which there is a fourth person, an arbiter [10, 11] . In this model, caution is taken against deception of the transmitter and the receiver as well as that of the opponent. The arbiter has access to all key information of the transmitter and the receiver, and solves disputes between them. We denote by E R the set of keys of the receiver and by E T denotes the set of keys of the transmitter, respectively.
In this model, there are essentially ve dierent kinds of cheatings, impersonation by the opponent, substitution by the opponent, impersonation by the transmitter, impersonation by the receiver and substitution by the receiver. Denote these cheating probabilities by P I ; P S ; P T ; P R0 and P R1 . Johansson showed an entropy based lower bound on these ve cheating probabilities [12] . By assuming max(P I ; P S ; P T ; P R0 ; P R1 ) = 1=q, he also showed a lower bound on the size of keys in terms of q [12] . Recently, Kurosawa showed a more tight lower bound for a larger set of source states by assuming P I = P S = P T = P R0 = P R1 = 1=q [15] . However, combinatorial lower bounds on the cheating probabilities are not known. (The structure of A 2 -codes is not well known.) In this paper, we present combinatorial lower bounds on P I ; P S ; P T ; P R0 ; P R1 ; jE R j and jE T j. First, we show the following bounds for a A 2 -code model without secrecy. Let jSj denote the number of source states and jMj denote that of messages, respectively. Assume that each f 2 E R accepts c messages for each source state s. Let l 4 = jMj=cjSj. Then P I 1=l and P T (c 01)jSj=(jMj0jSj). If P I = 1=l, then P S 1=l. For a separable case, if P I = 1=l, then P T 1=l. If P I = P S = P T = 1=l, then jE R j cjSj(l 0 1) + 1. Similar bounds are obtained for P R 0 ; P R 1 and jE T j. Our bounds on P I ; P S ; P T ; P R 0 and P R 1 are tight because the A 2 -codes given by Johansson [13, 14] (in which c = l = q) meet our bounds with equality.
Further, we show such combinatorial lower bounds for general A 2 -codes.
Preliminaries

Authentication code (A-code)
In the model of A-codes, there are three participants, a transmitter T, a receiver R and an opponent O. The transmitter T and the receiver R share a common encoding rule e. On input a source state s, T computes a message m = e(s) and sends m to R. R accepts or rejects m based on e. An A-code is called an A-code without secrecy if a source state is uniquely determined from a message m. It is possible that more than one message can be used to communicate a particular source state; this is called splitting. Dening
M(e; s) 4 = fm j e(s) = mg splitting means jM(e; s)j > 1. If jM(e; s)j = 1 for 8e and 8s, the A-code is called an A-code without splitting.
We assume independent probability distributions on source states and on encoding rules, respectively. In the impersonation attack, the opponent O sends a message m to the receiver. O succeeds if m is accepted by the receiver as authentic. The impersonation attack probability P I is dened by
In the substitution attack, O observes a message m that is transmitted by T and substitutes m with another messagem. O succeeds ifm is accepted by the receiver as authentic. For no splitting, the substitution attack probability P S is dened by [7] . Proposition 5. [9] In a splitting A-code, let M(e) 4 = fm j e accepts mg. Then,
jM(e)j 0 max s2S jM(e; s)j jMj 0 min s2S jM(e; s)j
Authentication code with arbitration (A 2 -code)
We denote an A 2 -code by (S; M; E R ; E T ), where S = fsg is a set of source states, M = fmg is a set of messages, E R = ffg is a set of the receiver's decoding rules and E T = feg is a set of the transmitter's encoding rules.
The selection of e and f may be done in several ways. One choice is to let the receiver R choose his f and then secretly pass this on to the arbiter. In this case, the arbiter constructs e and passes this on to the transmitter T. Another choice is to do the other way around and the third approach is to let the arbiter construct both rules. In any case, on input s, T sends m such that m = e(s) to R. R accepts m i f(m) is valid. The arbiter accepts m as authentic i e can generate m.
In this model, there are ve dierent kinds of attacks. I, Impersonation by the opponent. The cheating probability P I is dened in the same way as eq.(2.1). S, Substitution by the opponent. The cheating probability P S is dened in the same way as eq. (2.2). T , Impersonation by the transmitter. The transmitter sends a message to the receiver and denies having sent it. The transmitter succeeds if the message is accepted by the receiver as authentic and if the message is not one of the messages that the transmitter could have generated due to his encoding rule. This cheating probability P T is dened as follows
Pr[R accepts m and m is not generated by ejT has e] (2:3) R 0 , Impersonation by the receiver. The receiver claims to have received a message from the transmitter. The receiver succeeds if the message could have been generated by the transmitter due to his encoding rule. This cheating probability P R 0 is dened by
Pr[Arbiter (or T) accepts mjR has f 2 E R ] (2:4) R 1 , Substitution by the receiver. The receiver receives a message from the transmitter but claims to have received another message. The receiver succeeds if this other message could have been generated by the transmitter due to his encoding rule. This cheating probability P R1 is dened by Proposition 7. [12] jE R j (P I P S P T ) 01 jE R E T j (P I P S P T P R0 P R1 ) 01 jE T j (P I P S P R 0 P R 1 ) 01 3 Combinatorial bounds for A 2 -codes without secrecy
In this section, we present combinatorial lower bounds for A 2 -codes without splitting and without secrecy. To derive our bounds, we develop three techniques. The rst technique is a reduction of an A 2 -code to an A-code. The second one is a restriction of messages which is described by the following Theorem. We consider a subcode of (Ŝ; E R ; M) such that the set of messages is restricted to M s . This is an A-code without splitting in which the number of messages is jM s j and that of source states is c (from assumption 10). Even for this restricted Consider the following subcode of (Ŝ; E R ; M) such as follows. Let X be the incidence matrix of E R (e) which is a jE R (e)j 2 jMj binary matrix. Remove the columns corresponding to fm i ji = 1; 2; 1 1 1 ; jSjg from this matrix. Then, we obtain an incidence matrix of an A-code without splitting (S 0 ; E R (e); Mnfm i g), where jS 0 j = jŜj0jSj = cjSj0jSj = (c01)jSj. Theorem 11 holds for this subcode.
The best strategy of the transmitter is at least as good as the impersonation attack against this modied A-code. Then from proposition 1, we have 
4
= fe j Pr[T has ejR has f] > 0g. Suppose that R has f. Then, R knows that T has some e 2 E T (f). Consider an A-code (S; E T (f); M(f)). It is an A-code without splitting and without secrecy because the original A 2 -code is so. Let P I (f) and P S (f) denote the impersonation attack probability and the substitution attack probability, respectively. Then it is easy to see that P R0 = max Theorem 20. Under assumption 10, 1. P R0 1=c 2. If P R0 = 1=c, then P R1 1=c.
Tightness
Corollary 21. Suppose that c = l = q. Then 1. P I 1=q, P T 1=(q + 1), P R0 1=q. 2. If P I = 1=q, then P S 1=q, If P R 0 = 1=q, then P R 1 1=q.
3. Under assumption 17, if P I = 1=q, then P T 1=q.
Corollary 21 is tight because all the bounds are satised with equality by the A 2 -codes given by Johansson [13, 14] .
3.5 Lower bound on jE R j; jE R E T j and jE T j
In this subsection, we show more tight lower bounds on jE R j; jE R E T j and jE T j than proposition 7.
Assumption 22. P I = P S = P T = cjSj=jMj = 1=l
Theorem 23. Under assumption 10, 17 and 22, jE R j cjSj(l 0 1) + 1. The equality holds if and only if the incidence matrix of E R is an orthogonal array OA(l; cjSj; ) where = (cjSj(l 0 1) + 1)=l 2 and each f 2 E R is used with equal probability.
Proof. From assumption 17, we can consider that our A-code without splitting (Ŝ; E R ; M) is without secrecy. Remember that jŜj = cjSj. For this A-code without secrecy, letP I andP S be the impersonation attack probability and the substitution attack probability, respectively. Then, clearlyP I = P I = cjSj=jMj.
From assumption 22,P S = maxfP S ; P T g = cjSj=jMj. Now, from proposition 4,
we have this Theorem. u t Remark. From proposition 7, we have another bound such that jE R j l For the model without secrecy, the lower bounds on the above P R0 and P R1 are the same as those on the original P R0 and P R1 . For the general model, we obtain the following bound.
Theorem 33. 
